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IN

THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

N0. 46945-2019

)

V.

)

Ada County Case No.

)

CR01-2018-1179

)

CANDACE JOY BARNES,

)
)

Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT’ S BRIEF

)
)

IS SUE

Has Barnes

failed to

show

the district court abused

its

sentencing discretion?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On

January 28, 2018, ofﬁcers stopped a car that had been reported stolen.

Candace Joy Barnes was the driver 0f the

vehicle,

three warrants for failure to appear. (PSI, p3.)

and dispatch informed the ofﬁcers

(PSI, p3.)

that she

had

A drug dog alerted on the car, and a search of the

car produced “a loaded syringe with a clear liquid that tested positive for methamphetamine.”

The

(PSI, p.3.)

state

charged Barnes with possession of methamphetamine, possession of drug

paraphernalia, and possession of stolen property. (R., pp.28-29.)

As
and the

the result 0f a plea agreement, Barnes pled guilty to possession of

state

dismissed the two misdemeanor charges. (R., pp.5 1-58.) The

released Barnes 0n

bond but revoked

the

bond

appear for her PSI appointments.

(R., p.65.)

Barnes “ran out of the courtroom.”

(R., p.65.)

at

a

bond revocation hearing

When

methamphetamine

district court initially

after

Barnes failed t0

the district court revoked

Bames’s bond,

“A member 0f the public

assisted in trying to stop

her in the courthouse stairwell.” (PSI, p.46.) Barnes kicked and bit the marshal, escaped, and hid
in another

courtroom

The

until she

district court

was found.

(PSI, p.46.)

imposed a sentence of seven years with a ﬁxed term 0f two and one half

years. (R., p.73.) Barnes timely appealed. (R., pp.75-77.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When

evaluating Whether a sentence

is

excessive, the court considers the entire length of

the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard.

State V. McIntosh, 160 Idaho

1, 8,

368 P.3d

621, 628 (2016); State V. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008).

ARGUMENT
Barnes Has Failed T0

The

district court

Show That The

did not abuse

its

District

Court Abused

discretion

With a ﬁxed term of two and one half years.

It is

when

presumed

it

conﬁnement. State

P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence

is

it is

Sentencing Discretion

imposed a sentence of seven years

that the

Will be the defendant’s probable term 0f

0f demonstrating that

Its

ﬁxed portion of the sentence

V. Oliver,

144 Idaho 722, 726, 170

within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden

a clear abuse 0f discretion. McIntosh, 160 Idaho at

8,

368 P.3d

at

628

(citations omitted).

To

carry this burden the appellant must

any reasonable View 0f the

A

sentence

is

facts.

The

Li.

differing weights

the sentence

is

excessive under

Li.

reasonable if

appears necessary t0 accomplish the primary objective of

it

protecting society and t0 achieve any 0r

retribution.

show

of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, 0r

all

has the discretion t0 weigh those objectives and give them

district court

when deciding upon the

sentence.

I_d.

Idaho 814, 825, 965 P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (holding

at 9,

368 P.3d

district court

at

629; State V. Moore, 131

did not abuse

its

discretion in

concluding that the obj ectives of punishment, deterrence and protection 0f society outweighed the

need for

rehabilitation).

“In deference t0 the

trial

judge, this Court Will not substitute

a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at

at

628 (quoting

ﬁxed within
discretion

by

m,

146 Idaho

the limits prescribed

the trial court.”

Li

148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27).

at

by

its

8,

View 0f

368 P.3d

Furthermore, “[a] sentence

the statute Will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of

(quoting State V. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324

(1982)).

The imposed sentence ﬁts Within
possession 0f methamphetamine

is

the statutory limit.

seven years,

ﬂ

The

maximum

statutory

LC. §37-2732(c), and the

for

district court

imposed a sentence 0f seven years With a ﬁxed term of two and one half years. That leaves Barnes
the burden 0f proving that his sentence

McIntosh, 160 Idaho

at 8,

368 P.3d

at

is

excessive under any reasonable View of the facts.

628. She cannot do so.

The length 0f Barnes’s sentence

is

reasonable.

As

the district court observed, Barnes has

a lengthy criminal history, Which includes four prior felonies. (TL, p.44, Ls.1 1-12;

7.)

And, while the

district court

m

recognized Barnes has a substance abuse problem,

ﬂ

it

PSI, pp.4-

also properly

found that Barnes has failed

t0 take

advantage 0f the

many

opportunities she has been given for

treatment:

I

note that in the past you had been given supervised release, Which you violated.

You violated on your burglary charge by using methamphetamine. You got a rider.
You got released, and then you didn’t follow through with your treatment. You
were paroled again. You kept using. Eventually, you absconded.
I

see a pattern of efforts, short-term efforts, and then using again, absconding again,

taking off again.

and

at extensive

(TL, p.44, L.18

—

I

Where you were given opportunities at both a rider
so far, what I see is a lot of bad judgment.

see situations

programming.

The

p.45, L.5.)

And

district court also

noted that Barnes’s behavior

at the

bond

revocation hearing, running from the courtroom and ﬁghting with a marshal, further illustrated

Barnes’s poor judgment in dealing With her criminal and substance abuse problems.

(T12, p.45,

Ls.6-19.)

Despite stating the issue on appeal as whether the

district court

imposed an “excessive

sentence” (Appellant’s brief, p.3), Barnes does not argue in her opening brief

imposed was excessive (Appellant’s
court abused

its

discretion

brief, pp.3-6.)

is

the sentence

Instead, Barnes argues only that “the district

by not retaining jurisdiction.” (Appellant’s

Retaining jurisdiction

how

brief, pp.4-5.)

He is wrong.

simply “a means of extending the time t0 evaluate a defendant’s

suitability for probation.” State V. Toohill, 103

Idaho 565, 567, 650 P.2d 707, 709

Thus, “[t]here can be no abuse of discretion in a
court already has sufﬁcient information

trial

(Ct.

App. 1982).

court’s refusal to retain jurisdiction if the

upon Which t0 conclude that the defendant is not a

suitable

candidate for probation.” State V. Jones, 141 Idaho 673, 677, 115 P.3d 764, 768 (Ct. App. 2005).

The information presented
candidate for probation.

to the district court

In addition t0 her lengthy criminal history, Barnes tested positive for

methamphetamine “steadily” while on

November

18th,

proved that Barnes was not a suitable

November 28t

”

pretrial release, including

and “December

“November

lst.” (Tr., p.44, Ls. 12-17.)

4,

November

6,

She had previously

violated the terms of supervised release by using methamphetamine. (Tr., p.44, Ls.18-21.) She
failed to follow through on multiple treatment opportunities. (Tr., p.44, Ls.21-23; PSI, p.7.) And
she absconded while her parole officer was trying to help her. (Tr., p.46, Ls.1-6.) Furthermore,
she repeatedly exercised “terrible judgment” in trying to deal with her problems, including when
she ran from the courtroom and attacked a marshal during her bond revocation hearing. (Tr., p.45,
Ls.6-19.) As the district court explained to Barnes:
I think you need time. I also think you need to work on your skills, and I don’t see
that as happening in any other setting than a structured setting. Because, you know,
had it just stayed at the level of using and us having a lot of proof of using, that
might have been a somewhat different picture.
But, you know, by the time you get to where it’s five felonies, almost any judge
who looks at it is going to say whatever we did before wasn’t enough because it’s—
while it’s always a good idea to try treatment if people are willing to work at it,
there’s a point where if a person is not willing to work, that is kind of the end of the
line on ideas that we have.
(Tr., p.46, L.16 – p.47, L.5.) Given Barnes’s extensive criminal history, her squandered treatment
opportunities, and her poor judgment in dealing with her legal and substance abuse problems, the
district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to retain jurisdiction.
For the first time on appeal, Barnes argues that her mental health issues caused her to run
out of the courtroom at her bond revocation hearing and to attack the marshal. (Appellant’s brief,
p.5.) She made no mention of her mental health issues when apologizing to the district court for
running out of the courtroom. (Tr., p.41, L.10 – p.42, L.8.) And her new cause and effect argument
finds no support in the record. Barnes cites only page eleven of the PSI, which is presumably a
reference to her statement to the presentence investigator that she stopped taking her medications
in 2015—more than three years before the bail revocation hearing. (PSI, p.11.) It is quite a stretch
to suggest that because Barnes stopped taking her medication in 2015, all of her actions since that
time were the result of her mental health issues. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that it
5

was anything but Barnes’s own choices
p.42, Ls.2-5 (“I’m not blaming

actions in

my

life that

that

caused her to stop taking her medication.

any 0f my actions on

have allowed

me

my

drug use because

it’s

been

t0 stop being a responsible person”).

(E

my lack

Barnes’s behavior

at the

(ﬂ

bond revocation

T11, p.44,

L.11

— p.48, L.6 (emphasizing,

0f

In any event,

Barnes’s behavior on the day of her bond revocation hearing was not the only basis for the
court’s reﬁJsal t0 retain jurisdiction.

Tr.,

district

in addition t0

hearing, Barnes’s extensive criminal history, refusal to

receive treatment, decision to abscond from a parole ofﬁcer trying to help her, and positive tests

for

methamphetamine during

discretion.

pretrial release).

The

district court

did not abuse

its

sentencing

1

CONCLUSION
The

state respectfully requests this

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s judgment

of conviction.

DATED this 2nd day of January, 2020.

/s/

Jeff Nye

JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General

1

Barnes

cites a

news

article for the proposition that

programs offered to Barnes “because
should not consider the news
the
the

it

article in

Idaho has since abandoned one of the treatment

was not effective.” (Appellant’s brief, p.5 n3.) This Court
reviewing the

district court’s

sentencing decision because

news article was not presented t0 the district court and this Court cannot take judicial notice 0f
news article given that the efﬁcacy 0f a speciﬁc treatment program is “subject t0 reasonable

ﬂ

726 (2014)
(explaining appellate court reviewing sentence “conducts an independent review 0f the record
based 0n the information known t0 the sentencing court at the time the sentence was imposed”
dispute.”

I.R.E. 201;

(emphasis added».

State V. Hansen, 156 Idaho 169, 176, 321 P.3d 719,
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